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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ) 
SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent,) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DON K. BARTON, et al., ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
Civil No. 15946 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued to condemn lands and water of 
defendant. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The court determined that the plaintiff did not 
have power to condemn water rights; after a jury trial, the 
court authorized plaintiff to take the lands it sought from 
defendant for the total sum of $40,000 just compensation 
determined by the jury. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order affirming the judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-respondent will follow the convention 
adopted by defendant-appellant of referring to the record, 
transcript and exhibits as (R ), (Tr. ) , and (Ex. ) , 
respectively. 
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Plaintiff sought to obtain 24.49 acres in Manti 
City, owned by defendants, for the construction of a high 
school. In October, 1977, the plaintiff Board of Education 
adopted a resolution authorizing the acquisition of the 
property by eminent domain, and after some unfruitful 
negotiations this action was filed October 25, 1979. 
Plaintiff sought also to obtain water; the court 
ruled that plaintiff did not have power to condemn water, 
and this led to a jury verdict less than the amount alleged 
in the complaint as the value of defendant's property. It 
is the usual practice in Manti, when selling land, to sell 
corresponding shares of the local irrigation company, 
representing water rights (Tr. 134, Ex. 16,17). The issue 
regarding water rights was made explicit in the pretrial 
order (R. 55-56, paragraphs 1, 2.3, 2.4). At the time of 
trial, the court ruled that the Board did not have the power 
of eminent domain with respect to the water rights mentioned 
in the pretrial order (R. 77). There arose a sharp dispute 
among the experts about the value of the water, the 
plaintiff's experts holding that without water, $1,000 per 
acre should be deducted from the value of the land as 
calculated from comparable sales with water (Tr. 201), while 
the defendant's expert held that no adjustment should be 
made to the value for the lack of water (Tr. 111). The jury 
verdict was phrased as follows: 
We the jurors impaneled in the above entitled 
case find the issues in favor of the land-
-2-
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owners and against the plaintiff and assess 
damages as follows: 
Value of the land and improvements without 
water, taken by the School Board --
$40,000.00. (R. 65) 
The court enetered judgment on the verdict and this appeal 
followed. 
I 
THE JURY VERDICT PROPERLY GRANTED THE RELIEF TO WHICH 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VALUE OF 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT 
Defendant complained in his statement of facts 
that the jury verdict was less than the amount alleged in 
the complaint as the value of the subject property. This 
was explained by Mr. Austin, one of plaintiff's appraisers, 
as a result of the inclusion of the value of water in the 
value of land. The distinction between the value of water 
and the value of land was later made clear in the pretrial 
order, and when the court ruled that the water was not 
subject to eminent domain, a considerable amount of the 
value of the property was lost. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures 54(c)(l) provides: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment 
is entered by default, every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. 
Furthermore, if the allegation of the complaint was in any 
sense evidence, it was up to the parties to introduce it 
before the jury, which was not done. Therefore, the 
-3-
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determination of the jury that the value of the land alone 
was $40,000 was not erroneous. 
II 
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO REBUT EVIDENCE 
OF A MIXED GIFT-SALE AS A SALE OF COMPARABLE PROPERTY 
Defendant introduced evidence of a real estate 
transaction which he now contends led to error. The 
problems with this evidence began when the defendant's 
expert witness, Marcellus Palmer, mentioned a sale by Grant 
Cox to the LDS Church of one acre for $10,000 as a sale of 
property comparable to the subject property. On cross-
examination, it developed that this sale had not been 
concluded and that it involved more than one acre; Mr. Cox 
also was to give adjoining property to the Church. The 
following testimony was given. 
Q. (Mr. Bushnell) Were you advised that Mr. Cox, 
in selling that property to the Church, 
likewise gave a donation of additional 
property for tax purposes in that same 
immediate tract? 
A: I don't know that I could say that. I knew 
his reasoning for doing it. I understood 
there was to be a gift involved. 
Q. Of adjoining property? 
A. I'm sure it would be adjoining property. 
Q. For which no consideration would be given? 
A. A gift would indicate that, alright. (Tr. 
122) 
Later, the court stated that the gift-sale by Grant Cox was 
not relevant. Then plaintiff requested permission to put on 
-4-
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Wilbur Cox, the local stake president, to rebut the 
testimony of Palmer about the transaction. Wilbur Cox 
testified that the transaction was not completed and that it 
involved the purchase by the Church of a part of five acres 
and a gift from Grant Cox to the Church of the remainder of 
the five acres. No objection to any specific part of the 
testimony of Wilbur Cox was interposed by defendant, 
although defendant objected to calling him as a witness. 
(Tr. 285-87) 
Defendant cross-examined Wilbur Cox at length, 
eliciting from him testimony about remarks of Grant Cox 
which might be hearsay but to which plaintiff did not object 
(Tr. 289 lines 7-11) that others were present in these 
conversations besides Grant Cox, and that as far as the 
witness knew, the matter was still in negotiation between 
Grant Cox's attorney, Arthur Nielsen, and the Church Real 
Estate Department. At the conclusion of Wilbur Cox's 
testimony, plaintiff moved for admonition to the jury to 
disregard the testimony of Wilbur Cox, which was denied, the 
court explaining out of the hearing of the jury as follows: 
[I]t's already before the jury and such a 
motion would be confusing to the jury and 
. . . expert testimony has heretofore been 
given and it has not been used as a 
comparable sale and, on this basis the court 
denies the motion. (Tr. 297-298) 
Defendant complains in his brief that the court 
erred in several respects in treating the Cox gift-sale. 
The following reasoniGg establishes that the court did not 
err with respect to this transaction: (l) Defendant raised 
-s-
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the issue of the Cox gift-sale; (2) the Cox gift-sale was 
not a sale of comparable property; (3) the court did not 
improperly prevent defendant from presenting evidence in his 
case-in-chief to support the comparability of the Cox gift-
sale; (4) the court did not improperly interfere with the 
cross-examination of Mr. Cloward with respect to the Cox 
gift-sale; (5) the court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing Wilbur Cox to testify; and (6) the court did not 
improperly fail to require Grant Cox to testify, nor did the 
court preclude erroneously the rebuttal of Wilbur Cox's 
testimony about the intent or motive of another. 
2.1 Defendant raised the issue of the Cox gift-
sale. 
The defendant's expert, Mr. Palmer, referred to 
the Cox gift-sale as a comparable sale which supported his 
appraisal during his direct examination by defendant's 
counsel. His testimony represented the transaction as a 
sale of one acre for $10,000. All the argument about this 
transaction and whether the trial court handled it properly 
should be understood in this light, that is, that defendant 
presented misleading evidence to the effect that a certain 
property had sold at a fair market price of $10,000 per 
acre, when actually the transaction included a large gift, 
the price per acre of the property bought was fixed 
arbitrarily, and the infirmities of the transaction as a 
sale of comparable property were known to plaintiff's 
counsel and his expert witness in advance. 
-6-
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2.2 The Cox gift-sale was not a sale of 
comparable property 
One of the prerequisites of a comparable sale is 
that it be a sale and not some other type of transaction, 
such as a gift, a judicial foreclosure, or a sale under 
compulsion of the power of eminent domain. In Sanitary 
Dist. v. Boening, 267 Ill. 118, 107 N.E. 810 (1915), 
evidence of a sale of comparable land was refused, because: 
(1) Part of the consideration for one of such 
sales was given in exchange for the owner's 
agreement to assist the purchaser in building 
a switch track, and (2) the other sale con-
sisted of two blocks of land sold together, 
the purchaser agreeing to divde arbitrarily 
the price between the two blocks. (118 ALR 
891) 
The Cox transaction has the same defects; i.e., that there 
is additional consideration for the $10,000 besides the one 
or two acres which were nominally purchased for that price, 
in the property which was given to the Church from adjoining 
land; and (2) the allocation of $10,000 purchase price to 
the one or two acres to be purchased was apparently 
arbitrary and not based on any reasoning which could be used 
to demonstrate the value of the land. It could be inferred 
that the Cox land was worth anything from $2,000 per acre to 
$10,000 per acre if it were to be immediately developed (as 
opposed to the speculative development of the defendant's 
land). This indefiniteness rendered the Cox transaction 
irrelevant, because it did not tend to prove or disprove any 
material fact bearing upon value, as required by Utah Rules 
-7-
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of Evidence 1(2). This indefiniteness also would have led 
to improper speculation by the jury. 
There was expert testimony that one acre was not 
comparable as a matter of size, which further impaired the 
usefulness of the Cox transaction. (Tr. 270) 
Stating the issue in simpler terms, the Cox 
transaction was not a sale. There is no authority in Utah 
law for comparing the consideration which changed hands in a 
gift-sale of lands for purposes of establishing just 
consideration for similar lands. To be comparable, the 
transaction must be a sale. 7 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
§ 8.05(2) at 8-16.19 
A further weakness of the Cox gift-sale trans-
action was tnat 1t had not been completed at the time of the 
trial herein. It was apparently more in the nature of an 
unexercised option; money had been placed in escrow, and the 
seller had assured the buyer that the land would remain 
available (Tr. 295 lines 9-10) but the seller required 
assurances that a church building would indeed be placed on 
the site (Tr. 290 lines 2-4) and the transaction was still 
in negotiation (Tr. 295 lines 24-30). The sales price in an 
option contract is not admissible as evidence of the value 
of comparable land. City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 Kan. 
621, 433 P.2d 351 (1967). Nor is evidence admissible of an 
offer which has not been accepted. 7 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, § 8.05(2)(b)(i) at 8-16.3. 
-8-
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Thus, the court properly held the Cox gift-sale 
irrelevant and inadmissible as evidence of the value of 
comparable property. The defendant's expert, Mr. Palmer, 
had already referred to it in support of his appraisal, 
however, before all the details of the transaction were 
before the court, and the evidence was thus before the jury. 
We shall have more to say on this subject in later 
paragraphs. 
2.3 The Court did not improperly prevent 
defendant from presenting evidence in his case-in-chief 
supporting the comparability of the Cox gift-sale. 
At a certain point in the presentation of the 
defendant's case-in-chief, the court limited the number of 
comparables which the defendant might introduce. 
THE COURT: Is there any need of going into 
those others, the other twenty-two? 
MR. FRISCHKNECHT: If he were allowed to say, 
your Honor, he tried to say that there were a 
couple of others that he feels are appli-
cable. 
THE COURT: Do you want to bring two more in? 
MR. FRISCHKNECHT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll limit you to two 
more. (Tr. 91) 
The defendant then produced evidence of a sale in Fairview, 
Utah, and of the Cox gift-sale. Palmer testified as follows 
about the Cox transaction: 
Q. (~r. Frischknecht) Do you feel, Mr. Palmer, 
that with regard to the size of the location 
-9-
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and the other factors that that sale for one 
acre for ten thousand dollars is comparable? 
A. (Mr. Palmer) Well, it's got some elements of 
comparability in that it's right close to and 
adjacent the subject property. That makes it 
more comparable than going some distance 
away. I think it's pertinent. It's one 
that needs to be considered. 
Q. Mr. Palmer, in this area or with this 
relationship to the City of Manti and the 
subject property, are you familiar or did you 
find other sales in that area? 
A. Yes. I found and looked at other sales in the 
area, north and east and west of Manti. 
Q, Did you consider those other sales? 
A. Yes, I sure did. 
Q. In your opinion, Mr. Palmer, are those sales 
comparable to the subject property? 
MR. BUSHNELL: If the Court please I object to 
that. I thought we were going into two and 
now we're going into whole groups in a 
generalized approach. I think this is 
improper and beyond the scope that he said he 
would go to. 
MR. FRISCHKNECHT: Your Honor--
MR. BUSHNELL: If he said he used them or 
didn't use them, we've got to go into the 
question of trying to disqualify them and 
show the dissimilarities which is just too 
far afield. (Tr. 100-102) (emphasis added) 
The foregoing recital of the evidence clearly 
sustains the conclusion that the Court's order was to 
restrain defendant from discussing comparables other than 
the Fairview property and the Cox gift-sale, rather than to 
interfere with testimony about the comparability of the Cox 
transaction, as defendant complains in his brief. Thus 1t 
-10-
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is not accurate to state that the defendant was "unable to 
go into the matter fully during his case-in-chief." 
Defendant's brief at 5. 
2.4 The Court did not improperly interfere with 
the cross-examination of Mr. Cloward with respect to the Cox 
gift-sale. 
Defendant asked Joseph Cloward, one of plaintiff's 
appraisers, several questions about the Cox gift-sale on 
cross-examination. Cloward stated that he didn't think the 
transaction was comparable because of the gift involved. 
Defendant asked him if he knew when the gift had been made. 
Cloward said he didn't know, and then plaintiff objected to 
the line of questions on the grounds that Cloward had 
testified that he had not used the Cox transaction as a 
comparable and that he knew nothing about it except what he 
had heard in court. The following ensued: 
THE COURT: What do you claim, Counsel? Is 
this relevant? You're posing things to him 
that he has no knowledge of. The only thing 
he knows is what he's heard since he's been 
here and he said he didn't consider it and 
wouldn't consider it based on what he's heard 
since he's been here. Now, I don't see where 
it's relevant from that point on. I don't 
want to limit you but that's how I feel about 
it. 
MR. FRISCHKNECHT: Well, your Honor, they 
have testified that there's some notion of a 
contribution here and I think I asked the 
question, that's true, and he started into it 
and I'd like to find out what he knows, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: But you asked him if he knows and 
he said he didn't know. Hell, if you don't 
know, just say you don't know, Mr. Cloward, 
and then we'll go on to the next quest1on. 
-11-
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Q. Do you know, Mr. Cloward, when the property 
was sold to the Church that we have been 
referring to? 
A. The only knowledge I have was the sale to the 
Church that has been stated here today. 
Q. Did you hear Mr. Palmer testify that in 
approximately March of this year that 
transaction occurred? 
A. I couldn't testify to all that I've heard 
today. 
Q. Would it surprise you, Mr. Cloward, if I were 
to tell you that that contribution made to 
the Church was made three or four years ago 
and has nothing to do with this transaction? 
A. As I stated before, I didn't know that. I 
didn't consider the sale and haven't 
considered it, and I probably wouldn't have 
considered it. 
Q. You haven't considered it? (Tr. 269-70) 
At this point the court broke in with the remark cited by 
defendant in his brief to the effect that the Cox gift-sale 
was not relevant and instructing defendant to leave his line 
of questioning. Then defendant, abandoning his line of 
questioning about the time of the Cox gift-sale, asked the 
following question: 
Q. (By Mr. Frischknecht) The acreage of one 
acre, according to your testimony, is not 
comparable because of the size; is that 
correct? 
A. I wouldn't consider it to be. (Tr. 270) 
It is thus clear from the record that this question 
pertained also to the Cox gift-sale, but it did not pertain 
to the line of questioning stopped by the judge about the 
witness's knowledge of the timing of the sale. 
-12-
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We have already argued at length in part 2.2 of 
the brief that the court properly held the Cox gift-sale 
transaction to be irrelevant as a comparable sale. It 
appears from the above excerpt from the record that the 
court's ruling during the cross-examination of Cloward 
pertained only to a repetitive and argumentative line of 
questions posed to Mr. Cloward (see McCormick on Evidence, 
§ 7 [2d Ed. 1972]) and that the judge was well within his 
discretionary powers in directing defendant to another line 
of questions. Further, it appears that defendant was 
permitted to continue with questions about the Cox 
transaction. Thus it is not accurate to say that "Appellant 
was precluded by the Court" from cross-examining the Board's 
appraiser about the Cox gift-sale. (Defendant's brief at 3) 
2.5 The Court acted within his powers in allowing 
Wilbur Cox to testify about the Cox gift-sale. 
There are several reasons why the court acted 
properly in allowing defendant to call Wilbur Cox to testify 
about the Cox gift-sale. (1) His testimony was proper 
rebuttal; it was necessary because defendant had raised the 
Cox gift-sale as an issue in the jury's mind. (2) As a 
rebuttal witness, he was not subject to the requirement that 
his identity be disclosed to defendant prior to trial. (3) 
There was reasonable cause in the record, apart from the 
personal knowledge of the judge, to support plaintiff's 
motion to allow Wilbur Cox to testify. (4) Defendant waived 
any objection he may have had to Wilbur Cox's testimony by 
-13-
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his cross-examination. (5) There was no improper emphasis 
placed on Wilbur Cox's standing in the community. (Tr. 287) 
(6) Defendant cannot now complain about the content of 
Wilbur Cox's testimony, because he did not object to it. 
(Tr. 287-97) 
At the end of the first day of trial, plaintiff 
told the court that it had one rebuttal witness left. (Tr. 
281) On the second day of trial, plaintiff informed the 
court that the witness would be Wilbur Cox, who would 
testify about the Cox gift-sale. Objection was made by 
defendant's counsel, who conceded that rebuttal witnesses 
were not subject to the requirement in the pretrial order of 
disclosure prior to trial. Defendant's attorney stated: 
.. plus the fact that the Court made a 
Pretrial Order on the basis that there should 
be no witnesses called except those that were 
named 1n the Pretrial Order except for 
rebuttal ... (Tr. 283) 
Proper rebuttal evidence is that "which tends to 
answer or explain" the adversary's evidence. Soliz v. 
Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11, 395 P.2d 25, 26 (1964). On direct 
examination by plaintiff, Wilbur Cox said his name, his 
residence, that he was retired, that he had recently been a 
stake president, that he had been involved in obtaining a 
site for a church building, that five acres were involved, 
that some was to be purchased and some obtained by gift from 
Grant Cox, that the transaction had not been completed, and 
that the price of $10,000 had been allocated to part of the 
acreage involved at Grant Cox's request. When asked whether 
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the structure of the transaction "had to do with tax 
considerations," the witness testified: "I'm not sure of 
that." (Tr. 287-88) 
On redirect examination, Wilbur Cox testified that 
his interest had merely been to get the five-acre tract for 
a reasonable price. 
Q: (Mr. Bushnell) So far as the Church is 
concerned, when you were in that official 
capacity, did it really matter to you how the 
money was allocated so long as you got the 
five acres for a reasonable amount? 
A: No, sir. (Tr. 297) 
When compared with the testimony of Marcellus 
Palmer, that the transaction was a sale of one acre for 
$10,000, which included a gift of adjoining property (Tr. 
101, 122), it is clear that the testimony of Wilbur Cox 
explained the defendant's evidence within the rule of 
Soliz v. Ammerman, supra, that it was proper rebuttal, and 
that therefore Wilbur Cox was not a witness whose disclosure 
prior to trial was required by the pretrial order. 
Furthermore, the record before the jury was 
incomplete and misleading prior to the testimony of Wilbur 
Cox, because it was not clear how many acres were involved 
in the gift-sale. This reason was given by the trial court 
as justification for allowing Wilbur Cox to testify, in 
response to the objection by defendants to the court's 
mention of its personal knowledge of the circumstances. The 
Court said: 
I feel that counsel for the landowner had 
knowledge prior to these proceedings that 
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this was not a comparable sale in that it 
covered five acres and the one acre was sold 
for ten thousand dollars, and I feel that 
evidence to clear up this matter should be 
heard by the jury and that is the basis for 
this ruling. (Tr. 285-86) (emphasis added) 
The defendant had presented evidence of a 
comparable sale which proved to be irrelevant. Defendant 
claims, in effect, that once the comparable was held 
irrelevant, plaintiff could not rebut it or explain it. A 
similar claim was made in Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Co., 49 
P.2d 958 (Utah (1935). The plaintiff was asked in rebuttal 
whether she had said to another witness, Peterson, that she 
had "crowded against the glass and evidently broke it?" 
This was objected to as improper rebuttal. The court 
pointed out, however, that Peterson had been erroneously 
required to answer an earlier question and in his answer had 
testified that plaintiff had admitted breaking the glass. 
The Court said: 
The difficulty was that the first error above 
mentioned opened the way for what followed; 
but the door having been opened, and Peterson 
therefore having necessarily testified as to 
what was in effect an admission, the plain-
tiff must be permitted to rebut it. (49 P.2d 
at 962). 
Thus the testimony of Wilbur Cox was properly allowed to 
explain to the jury the circumstances surrounding the Cox 
gift-sale, even though that transaction could not be used as 
a comparable sale. 
In cross-examining Wilbur Cox, defendant rehearsed 
the Cox gift-sale transaction thoroughly and in considerably 
greater detail than on direct examination, pursuing 
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questions not raised on direct examination, such as hearsay 
conversations (Tr. 289) about the terms of the agreement, a 
description of the documents involved, the identity of 
persons privy to the negotiations, whether the witness 
considered the land to be actually worth $10,000 per acre 
(Tr. 294 lines 9-18), and so forth. It is written in SA CJS 
Appeal and Error § 1735 at 1032 (1958) that: 
Error in admitting evidence which has been 
presented by or on behalf of one party is 
cured where practically the same evidence or 
evidence having essentially the same 
probative effect is afterward .. elicited 
on cross-examination. 
2.6 The court did not improperly fail to require 
Grant Cox to testify, nor did the court restrain defendant 
from rebutting Wilbur Cox's testimony. 
Defendant states in his brief that the court 
permitted Wilbur Cox to testify about Grant Cox's religious 
and tax motives "without even requiring that Mr. Grant Cox 
testify as to his motives," (defendant's brief at 5). The 
defendant complains further that the court prohibited him 
"from rebutting the testimony of Mr. Wilbur Cox." (Id.) 
The record shows, however, that Wilbur Cox did not testify 
about Grant Cox's tax motives (Tr. 288) and that testimony 
about religious motive was elicited by defendant on cross-
examination (e.g. Tr. 293). 
The court did deny a continuance requested by 
defendant who claimed that Grant Cox was out of town, that 
Grant Cox was the only witness who could rebut Wilbur Cox's 
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testimony, that defendant anticipated what Wilbur Cox's 
testimony would be, and that there was nothing in the record 
which supported the judge's remark that the contract 
involved in the Cox gift-sale could be produced in court. 
(Tr. 283-84) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 40(b) provides: 
If the motion [for continuance] is made upon 
the ground of the absence of evidence, such 
motion shall also set forth the materiality 
of the evidence expected to be obtained and 
shall show that due diligence has been used 
to procure it. The court may also require 
the party seeking the continuance to state, 
upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he 
expects to obtain. 
The defendant did not state what material evidence he hoped 
to obtain from Grant Cox. Although the record did not show 
at the time of the judge's ruling that there were documents 
which might be obtained bearing upon the issue, the 
defendant subsequently elicited testimony from Wilbur Cox 
that there were documents in escrow in Manti Bank bearing on 
the transaction (Tr. 289,295). 
Nowhere does defendant say, either now or at 
trial, that the testimony of Wilbur Cox is not truthful; 
nowhere does he say that the testimony of Grant Cox would 
correct errors in the testimony of Wilbur Cox. Instead he 
insists that it "colored" the jury's view of the case. This 
falls woefully short of a showing of prejudicial error; an 
attack upon a judgment and verdict must show an error which 
is substantial and prejudicial, in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, the result would 
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have been different. Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 
Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970). Defendant has shown 
neither error nor prejudice, and his attack should fail. 
III 
THE COURT PROPERLY PREVENTED OGDEN FROM 
TESTIFYING ABOUT HIS EMPLOYMENT 
The end of the first day of trial defendant called 
Dee Ogden as a witness. Plaintiff approached the bench and 
represented to the judge, out of hearing of the jury, that 
Mr. Ogden had been retained by the plaintiff School District 
as an appraisal witness and had been paid a fee for his 
appraisal, but that the School Board had chosen not to call 
him as a witness at the trial. Therefore, the plaintiff 
moved the court for an order: 
To prevent Mr. Ogden from, in any way, 
testifying or the defendant landowner from 
asking the witness that his appraisal was 
made for the School Board, or that Mr. Ogden 
was paid a fee. • (Tr. 279) 
The court further explained his ruling as follows: 
The motion is granted and it looks to me like 
it would not be proper and I think I would be 
com~itting prejudicial error to allow this to 
go Ln. You can call him for an appraisal but 
not to give testimony that he was employed by 
the School District or make any reference to 
the School District's paying him so you may 
get his appraisal, but that's the limit of 
it, Mr. Ogden. (Tr. 271,280) 
The employment of Dee Ogden by the school district was 
irrelevant and immaterial to the issues of the case. The 
defendant proposed to put Dee Ogden on as an appraiser; the 
issue to which his testimony would have been relevant was 
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the fair market value of defendant's property. It made no 
difference to the fair market value of the property whether 
the District had employed Ogden. Utah Rules of Evidence, 
1(2). A party may have consulted with many experts prior to 
trial; what defendant proposes to do is to find the expert 
in that group consulted by plaintiff whose testimony will be 
most to defendant's liking, and then introduce the 
testimony, claiming in the hearing of the jury that the 
witness is really plaintiff's, but plaintiff has tried to 
conceal the evidence from the jury. Plaintiff may have 
quite legitimate reasons for not using the expert, e.g. 
doubts about his competence, but will have difficulty 
persuading the jury of them. Under these circumstances, the 
question of a witness's prior employment is a prejudicial, 
collateral matter and thus the trial court's ruling can be 
sustained simply because the proposed evidence was not 
relevant. 
Defendant suggests that Ogden's credibility was in 
issue. It would have been, had Ogden been called to the 
stand, but defendant never called him. Furthermore, even if 
Ogden had been called as a witness, the court had power to 
stop defendant from introducing evidence about his prior 
employment on the grounds that the evidence went to his 
credibility. 
Under the common law, it would not have been 
possible for defendant to call Dee Ogden and then impeach 
him by showing his bias by evidence of his employment by a 
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party. McCormick on Evidence, § 40 N.96 (2d Edition, 1972). 
Part of the rationale for this common law rule was that: 
The party, by calling the witness to testify, 
vouches for his trustworthiness. McCormick, 
supra, § 38. 
In Utah the rule against impeaching one's own 
witness has been modified by Utah Rules of Evidence, 20 and 
45, which provide as follows, in pertinent part: 
Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose 
of impairing or supporting the credibility of 
the witness, any party, including the party 
calling him may examine him and introduce 
extrinsic evidence concerning any statement 
or conduct by him and any other matter 
relevant upon the issues of credibility. 
(Utah Rules of Evidence 20). 
This broad abrogation of the common law rule is somewhat 
modified by Utah Rules of Evidence 45(b) which states: 
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, 
the judge may in his discretion exclude 
evidence if he finds that its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the risk that 
its admission will .•. (d) create substan-
tial danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues or of misleading the 
jury •••• 
To determine whether the judge properly exercised the 
discretion conferred on him by Rule 45, we should examine 
the record to see whether any arguments were made to him by 
the defendant at the time he made his ruling which would 
clearly support the contention that he acted erroneously. 
There were no compelling considerations mentioned by 
defendant in his argument to the trial judge. (Tr. 279,280) 
Furthermore, the record does not support the claim 
of defendant that Ogden would have given an in-between 
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appraisal. The record is devoid of any evidence or 
representation as to what the appraisal of Ogden would have 
been. Assuming that Ogden would have given an appraisal 
higher than that of the other witnesses called by plaintiff, 
the evidence offered by Ogden presented a double edged sword 
to the defendant. If Ogden was called as an expert and his 
relationship to the district was not disclosed, his evidence 
could simply discount that of Marcellus Palmer who gave his 
opinion that the property was worth $6,600 an acre, or that 
of the owner, who stated in his opinion the property was 
worth $8,000 an acre. On the other hand, if the opinion was 
in the middle ground and it were revealed to the jury that 
Ogden was in fact an employee of the plaintiff and that his 
appraisal was higher than that of plaintiff's other 
appraisers, then the jury might be confused as to whose 
witness Ogden was and conclude that the plaintiff contended 
that the value of the property was that given in Ogden's 
appraisal. It is submitted that this latter state of facts 
was what the defendant sought to bring about by calling 
Ogden as a witness. 
In any event, the question of Ogden's being an 
employee of the plaintiff Board could not have added clarity 
to this situation but would have only confused the jury. By 
calling Ogden as an expert, the defendant would then have 
vouched for his credibility and should not have been in a 
position to need evidence about his credibility, not even to 
establish the partiality of plaintiff. It is presumed in 
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lawsuits that the parties are not impartial. Indeed, at 
common law the parties were disqualified from testifying 
because of their natural bias. The adversary relationship 
of parties is still a fundamental assumption of our legal 
system. Thus, the prior employment of Ogden was irrelevant 
and prejudicial and the court should affirm the trial 
court's order excluding it. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE APEX SALE 
Defendant's expert witness offered to give 
evidence of a "full city block sold •.. By Apex Hatchery". 
(Tr. 70) Plaintiff offered to prove that the sale had been 
under threat of condemnation, and the court decided to hear 
the proof outside the hearing of the jury. (Tr. 72) The 
superintendent of the plaintiff School District, Ronald E. 
Everett, then testified that he had negotiated with Morgan 
Dyreng for the purchase of some lands of Manti-Apex Hatchery 
Co. which the School District had selected for the 
construction of an elementary school. During the course of 
the negotiations, Mr. Everett told Mr. Dyreng that it was 
the policy of the School District to negotiate the purchase, 
if possible, and then, if necessary, to acquire the property 
by condemnation. Mr. Everett testified as follows: 
Q. (Mr. Bushnell) Was there any question about 
condemnation? 
A. (~r. Everett) Yes, there was. 
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Q. Tell us about it. 
A. Well, on the second meeting with Mr. Dyreng, 
it was necessary for us to explain to him the 
policy of the Board that if peaceful negoti-
ations were not complete, that we would 
condemn the property for the use . (Tr. 
75) 
On cross examination, defendant's counsel elicited that the 
School District had paid $25,000 less for the Apex property 
than the appraisal (Tr. 77), and that Mr. Dyreng had 
requested some time to consider the matter further after Mr. 
Everett had mentioned the possibility of condemnation. 
Then, after a few days, Mr. Dyreng accepted an offer from 
the School District. (Tr. 79) Upon hearing this evidence 
the court ruled that the Apex sale was not admissible. 
Oef~ndan: conceded in his argument that there were 
chicken coops on the Apex property (Tr. 83) which 
distinguished it from the defendant's land. The defendant 
testified in cross-examination, after volunteering that the 
Manti-Apex property had sold for $7,000 an acre, that--
Q. (Mr. Bushnell) That had many, many improve-
ments on it, didn't it? 
A. (Mr. Barton) There's some old worn out 
chicken coops there, that they don't use any 
more. 
Q. It had improvements on it. It wasn't vacant 
agricultural land, was it? 
A. The land had been vacated because the coops 
that were on it were not in use. (Tr. 179) 
Plaintiff believes that the court did not err w1th 
regard to evidence of the Apex sale, for the following 
reasons. (1) There is no basis in the record for the 
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conclusion that the court improperly refused to hear the 
testimony of Morgan Dyreng regarding the sale. (2) The Apex 
sale was under threat of condemnation, and therefore 
evidence of it was properly excluded. (3) Sale of improved 
property is not comparable for purposes of valuing 
unimproved property. The Apex sale involved a city block on 
which were constructed chicken coops, while most of 
defendant's land was vacant and only a "little section" of 
defendant's land had improvements on it. (Tr. 39, 102, Ex. 
18 slide 3, Ex. 14, 21) And although defendant's land lay 
within the city limits, it had not been platted into blocks. 
Thus it was within the discretion of the judge to exclude 
evidence of the Apex transaction. 
4.1 The Court did not improperly refuse to hear 
the testimony of Morgan Dyreng 
After Ronald E. Everett testified that the Apex 
sale had been under threat of condemnation, defendant argued 
that Morgan Dyreng should be called as a witness, stating--
MR. FRISCHKNECHT: I think if justice is 
done, [Mr. Dyreng] ought to be here •.. so 
we can see what he says about condemnation 
but, Your Honor, in lieu of that, as another 
alternative if you don't see f1t to allow us 
to bring Mr. Dyreng in here tomorrow, then I 
would say that what Mr. Everett says is that 
they talked to him about condemnation and 
they say they'll go back to the Board and 
talk about it, and make up a 
resolution ..•• I think what ..• Mr. 
Everett says is enough to show that Mr. 
Dyreng looked at the situation and said, 
"Either I sell to them or I'm in a 
condemnation action." The only way we're 
going to know that is to have him here, Your 
Honor, and I would request that we be allowed 
to bring Mr. Dyreng in and have him respond 
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to it and, if not, I don't think 
they've met the burden (Tr. 81-82) 
(Emphasis added) 
Twice in the foregoing argument defendant's attorney offered 
the court an alternative to his request to produce Morgan 
Dyreng, in effect inviting the court to rule on the issue 
without hearing Dyreng. The defendant should not now be 
able to predicate error on the court's ruling without 
Dyreng's testimony. See, Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 
182, 389 P.2d 734 (l964)("The court's comments on the 
evidence were invited by plaintiff's attorney with no 
objection thereto whatever. So we cannot reverse this case 
on that account." 389 P.2d at 735) 
Nowhere does the record show that the court 
explicitly ruled that Morgan Dyreng could not be called as a 
witness, as proposed by defendant. We are left to speculate 
what the court would have done if the defendant had called 
Morgan Dyreng as a witness to rehabilitate the Apex sale as 
a comparable. To save a question for review, it must be 
presented to the trial court and a ruling invoked thereon. 
Lovato v. Hicks, 74 N.M. 733, 398 P.2d 59 (1965). Defendant 
had a duty to pursue whether Dyreng could be called as a 
witness and obtain an order that he could not be before he 
can base a claim of error on the trial court's action, 
especially in the light of defendant's arguments in the 
alternative, inviting the court to rule without Dyreng's 
testimony. Lilenquist v. Utah State Nat. Bank, 100 P.2d 
185, 190 (l940)("No ruling on [exemplary damages] was made 
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by the trial court, hence the question is not before us.") 
Where evidence is proposed and objected to and the court 
postpones ruling on its admissibility, and the proponent of 
the evidence fails to thereafter press his demand for a 
ruling on its admissibility, the evidence is deemed 
abandoned by its proponent. McElwain v. Schuckert, 13 Ariz. 
App. 468, 477 P.2d 754, 756 (1970). 
Nor does the record show that defendant made known 
the substance of the testimony he expected from Morgan 
Dyreng sufficiently to raise an inference of error under 
Utah Rules of Evidence 5, which provides--
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, 
nor shall the judgment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) it 
appears of record that the proponent of the 
evidence either made known the substance of 
the evidence in a form and by a method 
approved by the judge, or indicated the 
substance of the expected evidence by 
questions indicating the desired answers 
••. (emphasis added) 
In particular, defendant did not offer proof that Dyreng 
would contradict Everett in any particular, or that Dyreng 
would rebut the inference that the threat of condemnation 
had been communicated to him by Everett. In Downey State 
Bank v. Majer-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978), the 
intervenor Ringwood argued that he had improperly been 
prevented from showing that a certain lien was void. The 
court said: 
Ringwood, however, made no proffer of what 
the excluded testimony would have 
demonstrated. A judgment will not be 
reversed for an alleged error in the 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exclusion of evidence unless it appears in 
the record that the error was prejudicial. 
Ringwood's failure to make a proffer of proof 
as to what his evidence would show precludes 
him from asserting on appeal that the 
exclusion was error. (578 P.2d at 1288 
(emphasis added) 
Like Ringwood, the defendant herein failed to offer proof of 
what Dyreng would testify, and therefore defendant should 
not be able to claim error from the episode. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 5, quoted above, sets out a 
procedure which must be followed to place the trial court in 
error with respect to the exclusion of evidence. The 
purpose of the procedure is to give the court an opportunity 
to correct his error during the trial. Plaintiff submits 
that the defendant has not shown a basis in the record for 
his claim of error with respect to the Apex sale. 
4.2 The Apex sale was under threat of 
condemnation, and therefore evidence of it was not 
admissible. 
In State v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 
552 (1962), the State appealed from an award in a 
condemnation case in part on the ground that the judge had 
required a witness to answer a question about severance 
damages relating to another tract which had been acquired by 
the state. The court said--
A sale of land to the State for highway 
purposes, by agreement of the parties, to 
avoid a condemnation suit is a forced sale 
and therefore is not admissible in evidence 
to show the value of other s1milar property 
being condemned. (371 P.2d at 556) (emphasis 
added) 
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In the case at bar the defendant complains that he should 
have been permitted to use the Apex sale, and that the Apex 
sale was merely characterized as one entered into to avoid a 
condemnation suit. The court below held, however, that--
It's the court's opinion that the sale would 
be in contemplation of condemnation. The 
court will not allow the testimony regarding 
that sale. (Tr. 85) 
This decision of the trial court should not be disturbed 
unless clearly erroneous. See, State v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 
317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969); State v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 
495 P.2d 817 (1972). Plaintiff respectfully submits that 
the record supports the action of the trial court. 
4.3 A sale of improved property is not comparable 
for purposes of valuing unimproved lands 
It is established by the record that all but a 
small piece of the defendant's property was unimproved, 
while there were improvements on the Apex property. In 7 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 8.05[2] at 8-16.8 that--
It is the generally accepted rule that 
evidence of the sale price of the improved 
property cannot be admitted to prove the 
value of unimproved property. 
This rule was explained in Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 110, 139 
(1962), as follows: 
[In Re Housing Authority of Newark, 126 
N.J.L. 60, 17 A.2d 812 (1941), the court 
excluded evidence of some improved lands in a 
suit to condemn an unimproved tract and] held 
that the trial judge properly ruled that as a 
matter of discretion that the evidence was 
inadmissible, since to go into arithmetical 
computations of value of neighboring land as 
distinct from buildings, for purposes of 
comparison of value, by taking the sale price 
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of another tract consisting of land and 
buildings as a subtrahend, and requiring the 
jury to ascertain from probably conflicting 
testimony the value of such buildings and 
deduce the value of such other land by 
subtracting the value of the buildings from 
the total sale price would introduce issues 
not fairly relevant to the inquiry. The 
court continued that the general rule was 
that for sales of neighboring or adjoining 
land to be comparable as indices of value of 
land taken there should be a substantial 
similarity of conditions. (emphasis added) 
That the question of valuing the improvements on the Apex 
property would have produced conflicting evidence is 
apparent from the testimony of defendant Barton, when on 
cross-examination he volunteered the Apex sale as a basis 
for his opinion of the value of the subject property. (Tr. 
179) 
Defendant complains that the plaintiff improperly 
cross-examined him at this point, because the court had 
earlier ruled that the Apex sale was inadmissible. 
Defendant is in no position to complain, however, because 
the record clearly shows that the Apex sale was first 
mentioned by him in response to the question whether he knew 
of any sales which would justify his opinion that his 
property was worth $8,000.00 per acre. (Tr. 178) Defendant 
did not object to the line of questions asked him at that 
time and therefore plaintiff believes that there is no 
error. 
A further problem inherent in the Apex sale is 
that the defendant's property is a tract of 24.49 acres, 
without streets and with little or no access to existing 
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water hookups, while the Apex property is a developed city 
block. Platted or subdivided land is not admissible to 
prove the value of unplatted acreage. State by Dept. of 
Highways v. Schrenkendgust, 551 P.2d 1019 (Mont. 1976). 
Thus, plaintiff believes that the court properly 
prevented the jury from considering the Apex sale because 
the Apex land was improved, both with buildings and as a 
platted city block with streets and services. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has argued in the preceding pages that 
the trial court did not err in any of the matters mentioned 
in defendant's brief. Plaintiff does not believe that there 
was any prejudice resulting to defendant, in a legal sense, 
from these matters; it is incumbent upon defendant to show 
(1) error, and (2) prejudice, that is that the verdict would 
have been different had the alleged error not occurred or 
had been cured. 
With respect to the admissibility of evidence of 
comparable sales, this court has said--
Whether the other sale meets that test is for 
the trial court to determine; and he is 
allowed considerable latitude of discretion; 
and his ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it appears clearly that he was 
in error. 
This case falls within the framework of the 
fundamental principle: that what the parties 
are entitled to is a fair opportunity to 
present their respective cases to a court and 
jury for determination. When this has been 
accomplished, all presumptions favor the 
verity of the verdict and the JUdgment; and 
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this includes all aspects of the conduct of 
the proceedings, and rulings of the court. 
The burden is upon the appellant ... to show 
not only that there was error, but that it 
was substantial and prejudicial in that he 
was in some manner deprived of such full and 
fair presentation and consideration of the 
disputed issues. Redevelopment Agency of 
Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 
522 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1974) (emphasis 
added) 
The court was well within its discretionary powers, in the 
view of plaintiff, to exclude both the Cox gift-sale and the 
Apex sale from the case. Furthermore, because there are no 
clear inferences of valuation arising from either of these 
transactions upon the record, it is not apparent that had 
they been fully brought before the jury, that the jury could 
properly have reached a different verdict. Both trans-
actions would certainly have raised collateral issues, as to 
the apportionment of value between sale and gift in the Cox 
gift-sale, and as to the apportionment of value between 
improvements of land in the Apex sale, which would have been 
confusing for the jury. 
Therefore plaintiff respectfully urges the court 
to sustain the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B~if!f/~nd/&:j _I 
Dan s. Bushnell i/ 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Plaintiff-Respondent's Attorneys 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3680 
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Served two copies of the foregoing brief by mail 
this ~fhday of June, 1979, upon defendant's attorneys, at 
the following address: 
Arthur M. Nielsen 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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